

Delicate Regional Security Milieu in Sub-Saran Africa: Sympathetic IGAD in Intra-State Conflict in Upper Nile Region, South Sudan

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Abstract:

The study on the role of IGAD in Intra-State Conflict was carried out from Upper Nile State of South Sudan. A descriptive survey research design was adopted for the study using a sample size of 108 participants who were interviewed individually and in Focus Group Discussions. Study findings revealed that IGAD performs the role of capacity building in the Horn of Africa and networking with other regional blocs in peace security; the conflict has brought economic crises in the region and greatly affected investment and rendering people homeless as well as refugees; funding is one of the challenges faced by IGAD and the lack of impartiality by member states; and reconciliation being one of the measures used among warring parties. The study recommends that the warring communities should always undertake the initiative to solve their problems without influence of external actors who have their own agendas and the need for IGAD to network with African Union force in beefing up security.

Keywords: Conflict, IGAD, Intra-state Conflict, Upper Nile State.

Introduction

Since decolonization of Africa, the power struggle within and between African governments has resulted in civil unrest and intra-state warfare. These conflicts have been the target of peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives of the Western powers, the United Nations (UN), European Union and neighboring African states. States, regional and international organizations have intervened, for example, to relieve humanitarian suffering, to defend and promote democracy, to defuse hostile transnational movements, to determine the outcomes of civil wars, and to build (and transform) the institutions and capacities of 'fragile' or 'failing' states (Ho!zgreffe, 2003). With the success African Union has experienced in quelling violence and civil unrest through regionalism, many hopes this

interdependence of states through regional integration has may be a possible remedy for African turbulence. This study sought to evaluate the efficacy of IGAD in promotion of international peace and security response to regionalism and peacekeeping efforts in Upper Nile state of South Sudan.

2. Background of the Study

African security can be simplistically defined as the ability of African nations to ward off all forms of threats to its survival ranging from external aggression to challenges of economic, political, social and cultural deprivations while coping with the challenges of political development and good governance. The issue security is usually explained by the stability and predictability of the system, and the level of negotiation. In an increasingly interdependent world, the pursuit of security by nations precipitates a feeling of insecurity in many other nations. After their independence in the 1960s and in response to the various sources of insecurity in Africa and the international environment, around 32 newly emerging African states formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 following the beginning of the "demise" of European colonialism (Elaigwu, 1996).

In 1954 an agreement was signed that provided for self-determination and selfgovernance for Sudan on 1 January 1956 after more than fifty-five years of colonization by the British. The British had ruled Sudan divided in an Arab North and African South until 1946, when it decided to reverse this policy and unite the country. Nevertheless, deep disparities remained. When the government in Khartoum renounced promises to establish a federal system in 1954, it led to mutiny of Southern army officers in Torit in Eastern Equatoria. "On 18 August of that year, just months before Sudan was to declare independence, a locally-recruited unit of soldiers called the Equatoria Corps rose against the immanent government in Khartoum" (Schomerus, 2008: 18). Several groups emerged and gradually developed in the Anya Nya movement that spread from the Equatorias to Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. The war lasted seventeen years until the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which provided some autonomy for the South in exchange for the rebels laying down their arms. The clashes between the Arab-run state and the peripheries are rooted in marginalization in the economic development process and exclusion from power structures." (Jok, 2007). Dissatisfaction in the south persisted and increased autonomy of the South was again limited. In response to the abolition of the federal structure a rebel movement was formed in 1978 known as Anya Nya II, and started attacks from Ethiopia from 1980 onwards. Then in 1983 Colonel Gafaar Nimeiry, who had taken power in Khartoum through a coup d'etat in 1969, instituted the Shari'a Islamic law in the whole country, including the South. This proved to be the final drop for the predominantly Christian South, which felt more and more oppressed by the predominantly Islamic North. After mutiny of a group of Southern soldiers in Bor and Pibor, John Garang was sent to deal with the problem, but he joined the Anya Nya II movement and formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), marking the beginning of the second Sudanese civil war. Soon thereafter, conflict grew between the SPLA and Anya Nya II and the latter joined the government. In Khartoum a coup d'etats in 1985 and various changes of government followed until in 1989 Omar Hassan al-Bashir took power and ruled the country through the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation. He allied himself with Hassan al-Tarabi, the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF) that had been influencing Khartoum politics since 1979. Al-Bashir was then appointed as president of Sudan in 1993 and the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation was dissolved. Exploiting the tensions between Southern groups, Al-Bashir used various proxy forces to fight within and against the South. Further complicating the conflict was the discovery of large oil reserves in the South in the late 1970s. Production was predominantly controlled by the north and formed an extra motivation for continuation of the conflict on both sides. Oil production was used to finance the conflict, oil fields became strategic targets, oil related development such as roads eased military movements, and foreign interests in oil not necessarily aligned with the promotion of peace (c.f. Switzer, 2002: ECOS, 2010). The SPLA claimed to fight for John Garang's vision of a

federal Sudan with equal rights for all citizens. This, however, was criticized by some as an attempt to bring the south under SPLA that is Dinka control. "In the early 1980s Equatorians supported the expulsion of Dinka and other Nilotic peoples from their region and, in response, a belief developed in SPLA ranks that Equatorians had never truly 'supported the struggle, (Schomerus, 2008). SPLA-commanders Riek Machar (Nuer), Lam Akal (Shilluk) and Gordon Kong (Nuer) attempted a coup against Garang in 1991. Whereas Garang advocated for a united secular and democratic 'New Sudan', Machar advocated a politically independent South Sudan. Machar broke away with the SPLA-Nasir faction after a failed coup.

Machar's Nuer militia attacked the Bor Dinka in Garang's home territory in 1991. More than 100,000 people (almost all civilians) were estimated to be killed in this attack and the victorious Nuer looted and took cattle with them back North. This is one of the rawest and still persistent wounds in the South (and in Jonglei in particular) and still affects the relations between Dinka and Nuer today (Young, 2007). Machar signed the 'April 1997 Peace Agreement' with the NIF, through which seven armed groups used by Khartoum as proxy were symbolically combined into the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF). The alliance between Khartoum and the SSDF was maintained by providing resources, providing cash payouts to senior commanders, playing the 'ethnic card' and drawing upon popular prejudices against John Garang and the Dinka ethnic group as the SSDF was primarily Nuer (Small Arms Survey, 2006). Within the SSDF Machar, unable to push for a referendum on southern selfdetermination in exchange for his cooperation against the SPLA, became frustrated and ended his alliance with the Government of Sudan (GoS) in 2000. He briefly formed the Sudan People's Defense Force (SPDF) before re-joining the SPLA. Paulino Matieb took control over the SSDF forces, and "became a potent symbol for disaffected Nuer and other southerners who had rejected Garang's leadership" (Young, 2007). Garang never entered full negotiations with the SSDF and always tried to lure individual commanders to defect, only to marginalize these defectors afterwards (Young, 2005). Then on January 2005, with much international pressure, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Nairobi, formally ending war between North and South. The CPA started a six-year interim period which contained the possibility for an independent South through a referendum in 2011. During the 6-year period the South gained a large degree of autonomy and the country was ruled by a Government of National Unity consisting of the Gos and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). The referendum started on 9 January in 2011, and the official results released on 8 February showed that 98,83 per cent voted for independence (SSRC & SSRB, 2011). The date set for independence is 9 June 2011 while many challenges remain. Creating a unified south proves difficult, as there is little trust between various groups within the South. Several 'private armies' within the SPLA remain loyal to their commanders whose authority trumps regular chain of command, and reportedly as little as 30 per cent of the SPLA is under control of the SPLA command (Evoy & LeBrun, 2010). Furthermore, tensions remain high and fighting has again erupted between the north and the south in Abyei, as well as between different tribes in the south as exemplified by the recent violence in Upper Nile state.

Conflict resolution traditionally starts at the community level in South Sudan although capacities to do so vary throughout. Common disagreement within the community can be resolved within the community, with additional help from traditional leaders and sometimes the police. Examples of security promotion by the community themselves Conflict resolution traditionally starts at the community level in South Sudan although capacities to do so vary throughout. Common disagreement within the community can be resolved within the community, with additional help from traditional leaders and sometimes the police. Examples of security promotion by the community themselves. African Union in conflict resolution; show that the AU has indeed began to administer complex, costly and dangerous peacekeeping operations - formerly the preserve of the United Nations. Thus, the Peace and Security Council loosely modelled on the UN Security Council, which was created as a response to increasing cases of conflicts in Africa, has become the

most visible evidence of Africa's growing security capacity Where peaceful resolution had failed in conflict resolution in Africa in the past therefore, the AU had even resorted to military intervention. (AU Summit, 2002). The AU's first military intervention in a member state was the May 2003 deployment of Peacekeeping forces of soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi. AU troops were also deployed in Sudan for peacekeeping in the Darfur conflict, before the mission was handed over to the United Nations on 1 January 2008. The AU has also sent a peacekeeping mission to Somalia of which the troops are from Uganda and Burundi.

3. Literature Review

3.1 Theoretical review: The Realist Theory

The realists believe that states do not act unselfishly in the international system, as they are inclined to pursue parochial national interests (Morgenthau, 1967). According to this school of thought, when states conduct peacemaking interventions in the domestic affairs of other states, apparently on behalf of the international community, they do so not only to secure political and diplomatic support and consensus but also to camouflage their own national interests. Globalists, on the other hand, believe that the post-Cold War international system constitutes what can loosely be called a global community. Thus, when states undertake peacemaking interventions, they do so primarily to alleviate human suffering.

According to the realist perspective, intervention can still be best understood in terms of power and interest while the globalist's view international law and moral principles as also playing significant roles (Sassy,1990). Thus, while globalists have justified expanding international intervention, realists warn that hegemony may cloak their interests in the language of the common good and may claim to be acting in the name of the international community. For instance, Sub-regional hegemony often tries to obtain multilateral consensus after initiating and orchestrating peacemaking interventions, "in order to achieve their hidden agendas in the target states." (Lyons&. Mastanduno, 1995: 12). The realist paradigm suggests two factors that are likely to be important in the decision to undertake a peacemaking intervention: power and interest (Robert et al, 2010) the globalist paradigm suggests two completely different factors: international law and morality as bases of intervention in other state's conflict. The study will be anchored on the realist or struggle for power and survival theory by Morgenthau, 1967. Realism assumes that all human beings inherently seek to increase their power. Morgenthau (1967) further argues that success is the degree to which one is able to impose hegemony over other(s). The choice of these occasions will be determined by a careful calculation of the interests involved and the power available. In regards to intervention, Morgenthau argues that "most of the interveners secure their national interest where their power gives them a chance to succeed. In international politics, states are always concerned about national interests such as security and wealth. This theory further assumes that when states conduct peacemaking interventions in the domestic affairs of other states, in order to secure political and diplomatic support (Morgenthau, 1967). It is on this theoretical background that the current study seeks to interrogate realism in relation to the regional intervention in South Sudan conflict peace and security in intrastate of Upper Nile.

3.2 Game Theory

The second theory that this study was anchored on is the game theory by (Myerson, 1991). Taken as a branch of applied mathematics that is used in the social sciences, the theory attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations or games, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others (Myerson, 1991). Games theory has been widely recognized as an important tool in many fields. According to Ofoegbu (1980), the games framework of international relations focuses attention on rational choices and conflict resolution. Other notable contributions to the evolution of games theory include the works of Von N'eumann and Morgenstern (1947), Morgenstern (1963), W.H. Rikert (1962), and Thomas Schelling (1960).

Intrastate conflicts in Africa especially in African Union in promotion of international Peace and security in intra-state in South Sudan.

To interrogate the concept of conflict, we must agree that conflict is as old as mankind. Experience has shown that conflicts are usually the result of incompatible interests. We also know that human beings are in one form of relationship or another. It is in these relationships that conflicts generally occur. (Dahrendorf 1959) Furthermore, Wasburn (1982) cited a posited that in every social organization, including total societies, there are some positions with the right to exercise control over others and this differential distribution of authority becomes the determining factor of politically significant social conflict. In addition, to demonstrate that conflict pervades human existence. On causes of conflict, Ball and Peters (2003:31) are of the opinion that the diversity that gives rise to conflict need not have an objective base such as economic or racial differences. They at the same time recognize that all differences are not sources of conflict at public level because; the differences between tall men and short men do not give rise to political conflict. On his part, Halebsky (1976:101) has among other factors opined that: racial, ethnic, linguistic, and other cultural traits are frequent sources of group differences and conflict. However, it appears as if self-interest is at the root of all conflicts and it has in this regard, been posited that if we scrutinize some former wars in the world, conflicts therefore pervade the entire society. Thus, to engage in conflict resolution, would not be a curious African engagement. In the example cases considered here, GAD and relevant sub-regional organization either cooperated or failed to successfully cooperate, providing a study of the practice of the working relationship as it is unfolding in the present, regardless of the principles that exist in the legal agreements. East Africa/the Horn of Africa generally suffers from a void in regional leadership in peacemaking, despite IGAD's past leadership on the peace process that led to the resolution of the long-running war between the Government of Sudan and the Southern rebel groups. Strong institutional rivalry occurring in both South and West Africa between the AU and relevant sub-regional organization (and at times, the UN), where the principle of subsidiary is only claimed when it is politically convenient. Decision making on mediations and peacemaking remains fraught and stressed rather than reflecting true collaboration or implementation of the principle of comparative advantage.

3.3 Scenario of Zimbabwe

The study carried out in Zimbabwe has been plagued by thirty years of democracy, a legacy of racially-based land alienation, and a more recent profound economic collapse in the early 2000s. Elections since 1980 have often been accompanied by violence and intimidation, while the land reform issue has also caused internal crises over many years that have more recently resulted in external condemnation and concern due to the government's increasingly rapid and politicized takeover of white-owned farms. Robert Mugabe, liberation hero and head of government since 1980, has led his ZANU-PF party through three decades of political dominance, although not without using the state security apparatuses and other resources to help secure his political position. Shortly after the June 2008 presidential run-off elections in Zimbabwe, the Annual AU Assembly Summit also took the events under consideration. The AU shied from condemning Mugabe's electoral tampering and political violence. Rather, the AU called on the parties to come together and resolve the crisis. The resolution also expressed the AU's support for the SADC facilitation, and recommended that SADC should continue to carry out the mediation process by establishing a local mechanism to speed a negotiated end to the crisis. Certain voices within the AU, however, did call for stronger action in the face of ongoing stalemate. By December 2008, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga called for an AU ousting of President Mugabe, specifically requesting that then-AU Chair Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete should implement a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis. Privately, a diplomatic battle did ensue between Kikwete and Mbeki, with Presidents Kikwete, Mwanawasa of Zambia and Khama of Botswana urging an expanded mediation team and a more robust UN role. The efforts were strongly resisted by Mbeki.¹⁸ Mbeki did however help conclude

the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 11 September 2008, bringing an end to the immediate political crisis.

3.4 Scenario of Kenya

The study in Kenya reflected on election-related violence, resulting in 3,000 to 6,000 deaths between 1991 and 1998, with large numbers displaced. Daniel Arap MoPs contentious presidency from 1978 to 2002, paved the way for a joint cross-ethnic opposition campaign and victory in 2002 led by Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki. However, by 2005, the co-ethnic government split over power sharing and constitutional disputes, forming the two sides that would confront each other in the 2007 election: Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU). The ODM was viewed as being dominated by ethnic Luo and Kalenjin, the PNU by the majority Kikuyu. The ethnic unease was largely rooted in concerns over land and power sharing, with the smaller ethnic groups weary of Kikuyu dominance. The Luo, Kenya's second largest tribe, more specifically felt excluded in the government and political system. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, under the umbrella of the All-Africa Conference of Churches, entered as the first external mediator, but found that he was unable to get the two parties to agree to international mediation. AU Chairman and Ghanaian President John Kufuor then went to Kenya in early January 2008 to lead the effort. He presented the parties with a document outlining steps to resolve the crisis. The PNU rejected the proposal for a possible re-run of the election that was favoured by the ODM. Near the end of the mission, Kufuor announced that the mediation would be further handled by a Panel of Eminent African Personalities, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The parties accepted. The final lead mediation team arrived in Kenya on 24 January 2008 and initiated the dialogue between the two negotiating teams, including five representatives from each of the political parties. For the first month of the process only indirect talks were held. The teams worked out an agenda and the issues that needed to be addressed, but after a few weeks, no agreement was yet reached over how to resolve the election predicament. After delays by the parties, Kofi Annan suspended the process and called for direct talks between Kibaki and Odinga, which he would facilitate. Annan contended that he could not let the parties hide behind the mediators any longer. The final talks included Annan, Kibaki, Odinga, former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa, and Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete (then-AU Chair), bringing a strong East African regional influence into the final power-sharing negotiations.

3.4 The challenges faced by Regional Organizations in Promoting Peace and Security in intra-state conflict.

The central procedural problem that has already been illustrated is that there are no definitive guidelines provided in the AU charter, the PSC protocol, or any other high level document that define the process and entry point for mediation. this void allows for ad hoc procedures to be followed which may clash with the efforts of sub-regional organizations or other actors. in Madagascar, the au and SADC, tried to initiate mediation efforts and ultimately undermined each other attempts to act in the lead position, creating confusion and tension that took away from the focus on resolving the crisis. Without procedures being defined, regional or international entry will be left in the hands of political heavy weights that may or may not have an implementable, functioning peacemaking strategy and that may or may not be willing to commit to seeing out a durable peace. Certain institutional weaknesses still need to be improved on within the AU itself. The AU December 2007 self-audit produced a strong critique of the administrative management of the organization under AU Commissioner Kanan. It described the relationship between the chair and the eight commissioners as dysfunctional, and that there was a poor institutionalization of authority levels. There was no acceptance of a clear chain of command or a way to coordinate overlapping mandates, which are a frequent occurrence. The Commission was also under-staffed and relying heavily on short-term consultants rather than permanent staff, which undoubtedly contributed to the inability to institutionalize working relationships and coordination between

departments. The unclear principles at the top are filtering through to unclear operations at all administrative levels.

4. Methodology

The research employed a descriptive survey design, aimed at giving a detailed account and in depth description of the views of the respondents. The research population for this study was 150 as a target population and they consisted of IGAD representatives in Upper Nile State, South Sudan as well as local leaders within communities, NGO officials, and political activists.

Categories of respondents	Targeted Population	Sample Size	Sampling Technique
IGAD			
NGOs	25	20	
Officials	25	18	
Political	30	20	
Activist	70	50	
Community Leaders			

The main research tool used in this study was an interview guide. The interviews were conducted with GAD representatives, NGO officials, Political Activists and the selected local community leaders. The rated findings were used to compute a content validity index using the formula $0.7 \text{ validity} = \frac{kr}{(1 + (k-1)r)}$. The researcher also measured the reliability of the questionnaire items. Cronbach's alpha was also used to determine the coefficient between a sincere response and all other sincere responses of the same item that were drawn randomly from the same population of interest. The formula used was $\alpha = \frac{kr}{(1 + (k-1)r)}$. It made use of the number of variables or question items in the instrument (k) and the average correlation between pairs of items (r): The researcher ensured reliability by constructing thorough conceptual framework in which the terms used in data collection instruments was explained and analyzed using Statistical package for Social Sciences (SPSS). During data analysis, the study researcher categorized the data by identifying recurring themes, languages, opinions, and beliefs to have an ascertained IGAD in Intra-St Ate Conflict in Upper Nile, South Sudan.

5. Discussion of the Result and Finding

5.1 Silhouette of the respondents

The majority were male represented by 63%. Women were the minority represented by 37%. The results reveal that the majority of respondents could read and comprehend IGAD in Intra-St Ate Conflict in Upper Nile, South Sudan.

5.2 Overall evidence

The 1996 IGAD Agreement included among its principles the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and people's rights. A new objective was to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue. The IGAD Secretariat was restructured to fulfil the new mandate and in due course it established a division responsible for peace and security. However, IGAD's institutional changes lagged behind real political processes within the region. IGAD was very instrumental in the signing of the CPA on January 9, 2005. The CPA includes updates and amendments to previous protocols. The CPA itself is comprised of six protocols concluded between 2002 and 2005. The Machakos Protocol signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July 2002, in which the parties agreed on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the

transitional process and the structures of government as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion. A six-year Interim Period, at the end of which, the people of southern Sudan were given the right to vote in a self-determination referendum to decide whether to remain united with Sudan or to secede.

5.3 The role of IGAD in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan

One significant capability of IGAD is its work in Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) through the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). CEWARN is an IGAD institution dedicated to securing peace and stability in the region by influencing policy through a CPMR approach, producing and providing information to policy. This is differentiated from IGAD's mediation role, as CEWARN's CPMR mechanism investigates peace and security at a lower level in member states as opposed to higher level multi-country negotiations. Military intervention, when needed, is arranged by IGAD through consensus and is to be deployed internally in the region, with the aim to reduce reliance on foreign intervention. IGAD forces intervened during the 2006 Islamic Courts insurgency in Somalia and the IGAD Peace and Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) was the precursor to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). IGAD member states are the chief contributors to IGAD security forces. IGAD holds a role of investigating emerging crimes. It approaches issues including money laundering, terrorism, cyber-crime, organized crime and piracy on a case-by-case basis. IGAD is concerned with tackling the inland component of piracy as well as the maritime component. The work IGAD does in the area of emerging crimes contributes to regional and international stability. Capacity building was one the role played by IGAD. Capacity-building in the Horn of Africa is a priority for IGAD. It works to facilitate multi-country approaches to regional concerns, particularly in cross-border issues such as transnational ethnic groups. IGAD encourages the harmonization of policies across countries, which contributes to stability-building throughout the region. Its capacity-building functions include a focus on migration, trade harmonization and the movement of goods and people.

5.4 Effect of intra-state conflict on peace and security in South Sudan

The effect of intra state conflicts on South Sudan can be approached from an economic point of view. With 76% of South Sudan's households surviving on subsistence activities, informal trade is predominating and large amounts of economic activity take place. Trade between South Sudan and its 4 most important regional trading partners Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda has grown significantly in recent years, with exports from Uganda to South Sudan alone estimated to have increased from \$US 60 million to \$US 635 million between 2005 and 2008. The current South Sudan civil war has had a particularly large negative impact on investment and trade between Uganda and South Sudan with trade between the countries stagnating in 2009 before declining in 2010 due to the increased insecurity faced by Ugandan traders. Trade fell further in the run up to the referendum due to growing instability and dropped further since the onset of civil war in light of the sensitivity of cross border trade to changes in local security conditions. According to Ngungi (2010), 77% of traders in South Sudan are from female headed households that are dependent on cross border trade for their primary source of income, meaning the fall in trade between South Sudan and Uganda is likely to affect the most vulnerable in South Sudan. Majority of the respondents noted that the breakdown of law and order in South Sudan creates security threats to the South Sudanese people and its neighbors on how this happens. Consequently, the respondents mentioned that; it leads to penetration of small arms into neighboring countries, refugees flock neighboring countries creating resource shortages and insecurity, the conflict can easily spread to hosting refugee countries and that any country with no law and order brings imbalance in the region/ neighbouring countries. One of the respondent argued that "Given South Sudan's position as a regional oil producing country, conflict would close transnational energy corridors throughout Central/East Africa and negatively impact prospects for regional stability." Another respondent added that "While there may be some positive impacts on the region (e.g. from investment being

redirected from Sudan to other countries in the region), the evidence suggests that the net impact of conflict would be significantly negative."

5.5 Challenges faced by IGAD in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.

Accordingly, the respondents noted that the biggest challenge has been; political interference as well as external interference and interests from Uganda, Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. Others were: lack of credibility since one of IGAD members is directly involved in the conflict and also lack of partiality in mediation processes. Participants to the study also noted that IGAD member states and Secretariat display their lack of a genuine grasp of South Sudanese socio-cultural dynamics, lack of public cooperation, lack of key security infrastructure in the country, lack of funds and resources and leaders not respecting peace agreements as well as bias from regional leaders. IGAD has stepped up its activities in peace and security over the last few years. The IGAD initiative for South Sudan is the foremost indication of new ambitions within the organization. Furthermore, since 2012, the IGAD early warning system (CEWARN), has an expanded mandate in terms of geographical scope and type of conflict matters to be covered. At the same time, efforts are underway to finalize a new IGAD peace and security strategy, adding post-conflict reconstruction and development to the organization's list of strategic objectives. Nevertheless, IGAD remains a small organization, with around 50 staff associated with peace and security matters. A risk is that ambition is growing more rapidly than the organization's capacity and that there is a disproportionate focus on fundraising for the new activities, rather than ensuring effective implementation of the activities in place.

5.6 Measures to the challenges faced by IGAD in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.

The study went on to investigate what measures IGAD has taken to mitigate the security threats in South Sudan. From the findings, most of the respondents revealed that; IGAD has sent its mission in South Sudan to help mitigate the crisis/ offered reinforcement, Employ early warning mechanisms to prevent conflict, Approval of Protection & Deterrence Force (PDF) to come to South Sudan, Special coordination with UNMISS peacekeepers battalion on conflicts zones, Deployment of Monitors through the Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM), built capacities of national security and built capacity of South Sudanese security organs. The respondents were probed on the possible measures that have been tried by the government and community leaders to manage the conflict. In this regard, the most mentioned solution was; Reconciliation of warring leaders and South Sudanese society through negotiation and mediation. This was followed by promoting peace among South Sudanese communities, peace-building campaigns, commissions of inquiry, ethnic leaders for peace treaty negotiations, use of community elders at the local level and peace inquiries at the national level and use of non-state actors like local churches, musicians as well as regional organizations such as AU and GAD.

6. Discussions

The study was on IGAD in Intra-State Conflict in Upper Nile, South Sudan. The historical roots of the South Sudan conflict were found to be; skewed distribution of key resources especially oil and land, religious conflicts between Arabs and Christians, poverty, civil wars, ethnic conflict between the major tribes in South Sudan and dictatorial tendencies of the current South Sudan regime, weak institutional capacities, past injustices from the 20 year war with Sudan have not been addressed, concentration to state-building in-lieu of nation-building, North Sudan control of Sudan power, internal policies, external dynamics, lack of accountability and misapplication of formula of accommodation of political elites respectively. IGAD in intra-state conflict in Africa in Upper Nile State, South Sudan was significant though capability of IGAD is its work in Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) through the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). CEWARN is an IGAD institution dedicated to securing peace and

stability in the region by influencing policy through a CPMR approach, producing and providing information to policy-makers. IGAD's Role in Stability and Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa www.chathamhouse.org. Military intervention, when needed, is arranged by IGAD through consensus and is to be deployed internally in the region, with the aim to reduce reliance on foreign intervention. Capacity building was one of the roles played by IGAD. Capacity-building in the Horn of Africa is a priority for IGAD. It works to facilitate multicountry approaches to regional concerns, particularly in cross-border issues such as transnational ethnic groups. IGAD encourages the harmonization of policies across countries, which contributes to stability-building throughout the region.

IGAD holds a political role as well as a stabilization role. IGAD encourages its member states to live according to their constitutional rules, to adhere to the process of democratization and to maintain acceptable levels of governance. According to community leaders in Upper Nile State, the effects of IGAD intra-state conflict on peace and security in South Sudan. The estimates above are based on formal estimates of economic growth and trade between South Sudan and its regional partners. However, with 76% of South Sudan's households surviving on subsistence activities, informal trade is predominating and large amounts of economic activity will go unrecorded.¹⁶¹ Available data indicates that trade. The study identified the challenges faced by IGAD in intra-state conflict in Africa in Upper Nile State, South Sudan. Accordingly, the respondents noted that the biggest challenge has been; Political interference as well as External interference and interests from Uganda, Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. Others were: lack of credibility since one of IGAD members is directly involved in the conflict and also lack of partiality in mediation processes, IGAD member states and Secretariat display their lack of a genuine grasp of South Sudanese socio-cultural dynamics, lack of public cooperation, lack of key security infrastructure in the country, lack of funds and resources and leaders not respecting peace agreements as well as bias from regional leaders.

Therefore, the study found out that the major factor that has been sustaining the conflict in South Sudan was tribalism/ ethnic intolerance driven by political incitements. Others were; lack of will from the two warring parties, external interference, greed for power/power struggle, pressure on a diminishing oil resource base from the local-level ethnic people, historical injustices e.g marginalization, colonialism, dependency syndrome, social cultural dynamics and IGAD member states and Secretariat display their lack of a genuine grasp of South Sudanese (lack of neutrality of IGAD). Therefore, South Sudan peace process, although it was clear that the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission would be a critical mechanism to drive implementation, it was only after the agreement was signed that issues such as leadership, staffing, funding, and terms of reference were addressed. This created significant delays in establishing the JMEC, leading to a prolonged void of leadership to drive implementation. The expanded group of African and international partners, while critical in helping conclude the negotiations, did not establish a clear and shared vision for how to sustain regional and international attention after signature. Furthermore, the involvement of immediate regional actors in peace talks is a double-edged sword. From the outset, the engagement of IGAD's frontline states- Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan was critical to the parties' calculations and approach to negotiations. The sometimes conflicting interests of these states some of which subsequently became overt or covert participants in the conflict likewise influenced their approach to the process, particularly during IGAD summits when senior regional leaders participated directly in mediation. This was sometimes critical in advancing the process, and other times complicated progress, by fundamentally altering the direction of negotiations. In the eyes of some, this compromised the neutrality of the mediation. Consisting of IGAD states, the five African states mandated to play a role in the peace process by the AU, the AU Commission, the Troika, the EU, China and the UN have recently begun organizing themselves as a JMEC Partners Group. I will attend a meeting of this group in Nairobi next week. We believe this forum can serve

to coordinate engagement from South Sudan's partners, much as the IGAD Plus formation did during the final days of the negotiations.

7. Conclusions

The study concludes that the most common other possible solutions to the conflict in South Sudan engaging in home based negotiations like those that took place in Somalia (fight against warlords). In addition, the best strategy IGAD has employed in the management of the conflict in South Sudan is engaging high diplomatic mediation such as IGAD secretariat and peace ambassadors which however has not worked. The study further concludes that the measures IGAD has taken to mitigate the security threats in South Sudan are; IGAD has sent its mission in Sudan to help mitigate the crisis/ Offered reinforcement, Employ early warning mechanisms to prevent conflict, Approval of Protection & Deterrence Force (PDF) to come to South Sudan, Special coordination with UNMISS peacekeepers battalion on conflicts zones, Deployment of Monitors through the Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM), Built capacities of national security and Built capacity of South Sudanese security organs. The study concludes that the major factor that has been sustaining the conflict in South Sudan was tribalism/ethnic intolerance driven by political incitements. The most influential historical roots of the South Sudan conflict is the skewed distribution of key resources especially oil and land. Moreover, the oil resources helped in the perpetuation of the South Sudan conflict. This is majorly through oil resources being used to spread incitement and also procure weapons. In addition, the biggest impact of the South Sudan conflict on the national security of the country is proliferation of SALW across the horn of Africa. Additionally, the biggest challenge IGAD has faced in its South Sudan conflict management efforts was political interference as well as External interference and interests from Uganda, Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. The study also concludes that few regional organizations or bodies have successfully intervened in the conflict between 2011-2013, however about 7,000 African Union troops have slowly been deployed in Darfur on a very limited mandate, The UN Secretarial Council has been consistent across the country and emphasizes protection of civilians, human rights reporting, EAC, SADD, ECOWAS and church based organizations also participate somehow in ending the ongoing conflict in South Sudan.

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