MODELING THE PROCESS OF INFORMATION FLOWS IN THE VERIFICATION OF TAXPAYER EVASION

Abstract

The most significant functions of the tax system, characterizing various aspects of its activities, include fiscal, social, regulatory, distribution, incentive and control. To implement the correct operation of each of these functions, it is necessary to exercise tax control, an important part of which is tax audits. However, earlier work has shown that performing tax audits with optimal probability is an expensive procedure. Due to the limited budget of tax authorities, such checks are not always feasible. Therefore, to increase tax collection, additional methods should be used to encourage taxpayers to pay taxes honestly. This paper examines a tax control model that considers the dissemination of information about a possible tax audit among taxpayers as an additional incentive for payments. Within the framework of the evolutionary approach to modeling, taxpayers with different risk statuses are considered as population agents: risk-prone, risk-neutral and risk-averse. The idea of information dissemination in a population is studied on the basis of a Markov process in networks with different structures. The influence of this information on the final distribution of risk statuses and tax evasion of taxpayers has been studied. A series of experiments were carried out to model networks and the process of information dissemination in them. Models with artificially introduced centers of influence and in their absence are considered. A comparative analysis of the results obtained is presented.